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Abstract
We study a model where innovation comes in two varieties: im-
provements on existing products, and new products that expand the
scope of a technology. We make this distinction in order to highlight
how market structure can determine not only the quantity of inno-
vation but also its direction. We study two market structures. The
ﬁrst is the canonical one from the endogenous growth literature, where
innovations can be developed by anyone, and developers market their
own innovations. We then consider a more concentrated industry,
where all innovation and pricing for a given technology is monopo-
lized. We study the implications of the diﬀerent market structures
for both types of innovation, focusing on diﬀerences they induce in
the direction of technological change. We apply our model model to
the case of a hardware/software technology and analyze which market
structure oﬀers greater proﬁts to a monopolist who can monopolize
either hardware or software. We compare social welfare across the
market structures, and discuss whether one type of innovation should
be subsidized over another.
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In this paper we analyze the relationship between market structure and in-
centives to innovate. We argue that market structure is an important de-
terminant of not only the quantity but also the direction of technological
change. We present a framework to study the decisions of researchers and
ﬁrms about both the intensity of research and the allocation of research ef-
forts. This multi-dimensionality of research decisions is the new tradeoﬀ we
focus on. We argue that market power weakens incentives to generate in-
novations that increase the eﬃciency of existing uses of the technology and
strengthens the incentives to innovate by generating new uses for the tech-
nology. This tradeoﬀ creates diﬀerent innovation dynamics across diﬀerent
market structures, and leads to insights for ﬁrm strategy and public policy.
In Section 2 we introduce a continuous time model of innovation. We
consider innovations of two types: eﬃciency improvements to existing uses
of the technology (eﬃciency innovations) and developments of new uses for
the technology (scope innovations). The main diﬀerentiating feature is that
improvements are characterized by larger “business stealing” that is, the
proﬁts accrued to new, improved versions come with decreased proﬁts of
old products. On the other hand, new uses have relatively little impact on
the proﬁts of existing lines. We assume that developing a new use is more
costly than developing an improvement to an existing use and that there
are physical barriers on the number of possible uses (while the scope for
improvements is unbounded). The last assumption is suﬃcient for us to
characterize contrast cases where potential scope is relatively important or
unimportant.
The main economic force is that ﬁrms with market power over all ef-
ﬁciency levels of a given use internalize the “business stealing” eﬀects of
eﬃciency improvements. As a result, compared with a competitive market
(with ﬁrms that each own only one eﬃciency level for one use) ﬁrms with
market power have weaker incentives to develop improvements but stronger
incentives to develop new uses. These diﬀerences inﬂuence innovation dy-
namics, long-run product structure and welfare.
There are many ways in which innovations diﬀer in practice. The diﬀer-
ences we focus on (we refer to them as eﬃciency vs. scope dimensions or
improvements vs. new use dimensions) can be illustrated via the following
examples. In the market for computer operating systems, some innovations
are improvements to existing functions, which allow a more eﬃcient exe-
2cution of some tasks, while other innovations are new functions that allow
the computer to do new tasks. Similar distinction can be made for business
applications or video games. In the market for pharmaceuticals some innova-
tion comes in the form of an improvement to an existing cure, but also often
researchers come up with a cure for a previously uncured ailment. In general,
the relevant distinction comes from the demand side rather than from the
technological side.
For simplicity we study two polar market structures. On the one hand, in
Section 4 we consider a monopolist who controls all possible innovation, both
in terms of eﬃciency levels and scope of the technology. Such a situation leads
to expansion in scope for the reason described above: the monopolist seeks
to avoid displacing his own proﬁts on existing products and does not have
to worry about having its proﬁts taken over by a competitor. Over time, the
amount of research done by the monopolist decreases, as the physical limits
to the number of possible product lines are approached.
On the other hand, we consider in Section 3 a competitive innovation case
that mirrors the common setup of the endogenous growth literature. Each
eﬃciency level is monopolized, but all innovations compete with one another,
and there is free entry into innovation. Innovation often starts slower than
in the monopoly case, but as there are more and more products developed
the total intensity of research increases. At the same time, there is a shift of
research from new uses to improvements and eventually the market reaches a
steady-state in which further research is done solely on improvements. In the
long run the competition leads to a more narrow scope than the monopoly
achieves, but innovation never dries out.
Comparisons across these two polar market structures depend crucially on
the potential scope of technology — i.e. on how large is the limit on potential
product lines. The larger it is, the stronger are the monopolist incentives to
innovate (while the competitive market is usually unaﬀected), which makes
this market structure more eﬃcient.
We apply this logic to a classic IO question of the optimal pricing of
hardware and software. In particular, in Section 5 we consider a hardware
monopolist who cannot commit to future innovation levels in software, but
can commit to a market structure for software. By giving up market power
in the software market, he might enhance the value of the hardware he sells
by increasing the amount of software that results.
As our prior intuition suggests, the choice hinges on the degree to which
scope innovations are possible. When the hardware promises a wide potential
3for software to undertake diﬀerent jobs, the monopolist is best oﬀ providing
the software himself. However, if the potential for scope is not so great, the
monopolist may be better oﬀ giving up market power in software to enhance
the value of hardware, since consumers realize that business stealing concerns
will limit the rate of innovation for a software monopolist.
Our logic extends naturally to the question of social welfare and market
structure, which we touch upon in Section 6. Similar intuition suggests that
the socially optimal market structure depends on the potential a technology
has for being applied to a wide variety of areas. More generally, this points
out that considerations of the potential directions of technological change
might be important in answering questions about which market structure
most favors innovation and for informing intellectual property rights.
We also analyze how (and if) the government should subsidize innova-
tion. To answer this question, in Section 7 we compare a steady-state of a
competitive market and calculate the beneﬁts to research on the two types of
innovation. An eﬃciency innovation creates a permanent increase in the level
of welfare. In contrast, a scope innovation, even if it has a smaller immediate
impact, it increases private returns to research and leads to a higher rate of
innovation (reﬂected in the growth rate of welfare).
This result has several implications. First, a society might want to think
about not only how much innovation will result from a particular stimulus,
but also might care about the type. For example, the government might
prefer that the NSF focuses on basic research to develop new research ar-
eas, rather than on applications that increase the eﬃciency of the earlier
innovations.
Furthermore, the government might care about the side of the research
market in which it intervenes. Typically the economic incidence of a tax or
subsidy is independent of its statutory incidence, so this concern does not
arise. Here, though, as in Romer (supply versus demand), the government
m i g h tb eb e t t e ro ﬀ subsidizing innovations in particular areas on the demand
side, rather than giving a broad subsidy to the factors of production engaged
in research.
The relationship between market structure and incentives to innovate is
a fundamental topic in Industrial Organization. Since innovation and pro-
ductivity growth are so tightly connected, the topic is also relevant in macro-
economics. Most of the existing research focuses attention on the impact
of market structure on the amount of innovation. However, recent research
such as Acemoglu (2002) stresses that the direction of technological change.
4In this paper we argue that market structure is an important determinant of
the direction of technological change.
Moreover, the model that we develop provides insight into the classic
literature on the measurement of the relationship between scale and inno-
vation (see, for instance, Scherer (1980), and, more recently, Aghion, et al.
(2005)). One way to interpret the two market structures we study is that
it entails a single large ﬁrm, with more market power, versus an industry
with many smaller ﬁrms. If one measured the relationship between ﬁrm size
and innovation using data from our two polar market structures, there would
be a variety of pitfalls. First, the industry life-cycle would matter; initially
the closed standard (large ﬁrms) do more innovating, but later the open
standard overtakes it. Moreover, the closed standard does diﬀerent sorts of
innovation than the open standard, so comparing conventional measures of
innovation like patent counts might not be a consistent comparison across
market structures.
Our model has the potential to be developed in ways that have impli-
cations for other important policy issues. In discussing antitrust issues in
industries like computer software, Schmalensee (2000) suggests the impor-
tance of the industry’s Schumpeterian character. We further this line by
using modern Schumpeterian models to frame both positive and normative
discussion of such industries. We choose a structure that resembles most
closely that of Grossman and Helpman (1991), but of course the same ideas
could be embedded in a model along the lines of Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Our model adds endogenous variety, and in that sense is similar to a long
line of growth theory papers such as Romer (1987).
Our model provides a rationale for paying attention to whether support
for innovation takes place on the supply or demand side, as Romer (2000)
stresses. Since diﬀerent types of innovations have diﬀerent social beneﬁts,
it may be that the government has an interest in guiding through targeted
support (such as NSF support for “basic” research) a particular type of in-
novation
The commitment beneﬁt of opening markets that we study has been
developed in other contexts. For example, Shepard (1987) showed that li-
censing technologies to multiple competing ﬁrms can serve as a commitment
device for a monopolist seeking to deliver high quality. Similarly, Economides
(1996) discusses how a ﬁrm selling a product with network beneﬁts might
allow competition as a way to commit to a large customer base.
Our model has implications relative to the long literature on durable
5goods monopolies (including Coase (1972), Stokey (1981), and Bulow (1982))
where a monopolist can sell an object up-front, but faces commitment prob-
lems in future actions. Our model has two dimensions for future actions, eﬃ-
ciency improvements and increases in scope. The former involves the classic
commitment problem for the monopolist; the latter, however, brings a com-
parative advantage for the monopolist by being able to coordinate innovative
activity in a way that internalizes the eﬀects on existing applications. In our
model, when the number of applications is small, quality improvements are
relatively important, and solving commitment problems with software com-
petition is relatively attractive. On the other hand, when the number of
potential applications is large, the software monopolist beneﬁts from inter-
nalizing business stealing.
2 The Model
2.1 Standards and Applications
We study a continuous time, inﬁn i t eh o r i z o nm o d e l . I ne a c hi n s t a n t ,c o n -
sumers derive utility from ¯ N functions that are related under a common stan-
dard. The standard allows a function to be accomplished via a specialized
application. A given application j for function i has quality q
j
i ≥ 1 per phys-
ical unit. Without an application, the consumer can accomplish the function
directly at a ﬁxed quality q0
i = φ ≤ 1 per physical unit. If the standard were
a particular type of computer, examples of directly accomplishing a function,
instead of using a specialized application, would be using pencil and paper
instead of a spreadsheet or a typewriter instead of a word processor. We will
consider two ways in which applications are consumed. Applications may
be consumed directly (which we call stand alone applications), or consumers
m i g h th a v et op u r c h a s eﬁrst a piece of hardware which allows the purchase
of applications as software (termed software applications).
We deﬁne the standard to be open if each application is owned by a
diﬀerent ﬁrm. The standard is closed if all applications are owned by the
same ﬁrm and only this ﬁrm can innovate to obtain new innovations.1
1In the future we hope to consider a mixed setup with both multi-application and
single-application ﬁrms competing in a market.
62.2 Preferences
For a given function i, the representative consumer consumes d
j
i physical









The representative consumer’s instantaneous utility from a bundle of eﬃ-













i is the price paid for application j on function i and h is the amortized
cost of the hardware.
In equilibrium consumers will choose only one quality level, the highest
quality, denoted simply qi, per function. Therefore, given consumption of di





To simplify the analysis, for most of the paper we parameterize the utility




This utility implies that the demands are independent across diﬀerent
applications and the representative consumer spends a constant share of his
income on every application. In particular, if the representative consumer
buys applications q
j
i at price p, his demand is d
j
i =1 /p.
2.3 Output Production: Firms and Competition
Qualities fall on a ladder with rungs of size λ>1; i.e., for the jth quality




i .T h eﬁrst application has quality q1
i = λ.E a c h
physical unit requires one unit of labor to be produced, so the marginal cost
of production, per physical unit, is normalized to 1.
2The preference structure for a given application follows Grossman and Helpman
(1991).
7Competition Between Qualities in an Open Standard First, follow-
ing the endogenous growth literature such as Aghion and Howitt (1992) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991), suppose that each quality application is mo-
nopolized, perhaps due to a patent or a trade secret. There is a Bertrand
competition between qualities within a ladder. Non-leading-edge qualities
price at marginal cost; to match this price per eﬃciency unit, the leading
edge quality charges p
j
i = λ for j>1 and p1
i = λ/φ.
Given demand xi on ladder i,p r o ﬁt ﬂows for the leader are di(pi − 1),
where under Assumption 1, di =1 /pi. For instance, if φ =1 ,d i =1 /pi =1 /λ
and proﬁts are λ−1
λ ≡ π. Although our assumption of no dependence of proﬁts
on the number of applications is an extreme one, it is simply an expedient
abstraction to the idea that there is less business stealing on the creation of
new applications than on the creation of quality improvements.
Pricing in a Closed Standard If a single ﬁrm controls pricing on all ap-
plications, it faces only the limit price from consumers’ direct accomplishment
of the task. Therefore it can set price at most p
j
i = λ
j/φ.N o t et h a tw i t ht h e
Assumption 1, since unit elastic demand implies an inﬁnite monopoly price,
the limit price always binds.
2.4 Pricing Hardware
When hardware is sold, it is by a monopolist. He charges all the expected
surplus from the applications in the standard. He cannot commit to a future
stream of innovations or prices for applications. Hardware is produced at zero
marginal cost.
2.5 Innovation
Innovation comes through research. Research can be done on either devel-
oping new applications (i.e. applications for functions with no applications
yet) or on improvements to existing applications (i.e. creating applications
of higher quality for functions with existing applications). In both cases, re-
search takes place continuously and innovations arrive according to a Poisson
process. The arrival rate is proportional to the amount of research intensity,
denoted xe for existing applications and xf for new (frontier) applications.
We assume that research intensity comes from one input, researchers,
and that the pool of this input is heterogenous in their skills. A researcher
8of type θ can provide one unit of research intensity, at a cost ﬂow of θ for an
existing application, and a cost ﬂow of θ + η for a frontier application. The
inclusion of η>0 means that new applications are more costly to research.
Researchers’ types are distributed on [θl,∞) according to the cumulative
distribution function F(θ),w i t hθl > 0. We normalize the outside option of
researchers to zero. In the open-standard case researchers may enter freely
into research at any instant. In the closed-standard case the researchers are
hired by the ﬁrm controlling all applications at a uniform wage.3 In order
to keep the model from trivially having no innovation, we assume that there
are types θ smaller than the value of proﬁts of the leading application, or
F(π/r − η) > 0.
The critical feature of our model that ties diﬀerent applications together is
the fact that they draw researchers from a common pool of scarce talent. As
a result, innovative eﬀort on one application has an impact on the marginal
cost of innovation for all of the applications using the common factor. This
equilibrium eﬀect is what gives rise to all of the results about the dynamics
across diﬀerent applications that we develop below, and the diﬀerences that
develop between open and closed standards.
In the open-standard regime, when a researcher ﬁn d sa ni n n o v a t i o nh e
forms a ﬁrm and markets it (becoming one of the producers in the open stan-
dard). In the closed-standard regime, workers are hired by the monopolist
at a ﬁxed research wage w. Researchers (and ﬁrms hiring them) maximize
the expected sum of discounted proﬁts/wages net of research costs and use
a common discount rate r.
3 Innovation Dynamics in Open Standard
In this section we consider the equilibrium of the economy when the standard
is open. We will keep Assumption 1 and assume that applications are stand
alone, so h =0(i.e. there is no hardware to buy). We will also disregard
the assumption that ¯ N is bounded and instead will establish an endogenous
bound on the number of functions for which under the open standard appli-
cations will ever be developed.
3In the open-standard case, WLOG the researchers can also be hired by a continuum
of ﬁrms that have a free entry to the innovation process and compete for the researchers.
93.1 Analytic Results
Given the proﬁts π from the Bertrand pricing game, the innovation takes
place competitively. We will characterize a recursive equilibrium, in which
the decision rules of the researchers depend only on the current state of
the industry. Since obtaining an improvement over an existing application
yields the same proﬁt ﬂows regardless of the identity of the function or the
current quality level of the application, in such an equilibrium the strategies
of the researchers (and expected proﬁts of the producers) depend only on the
current number of functions with existing applications, which we denote by
N.
For simplicity we take φ =1 , which allows us to reduce the payoﬀ ﬂows
for the current highest-quality application for any function to be π = λ−1
λ .
Once we deliver the results we will discuss the case of φ<1.
Assumption 2: φ =1 .
Denote total research by x(N) ≡ xe(N)+xf(N). Since the beneﬁts of
research are independent of type, research follows a cutoﬀ rule: if type θ does
research on one of the applications, all types θ
0 <θdo as well (although they
can do it on some other application). The cutoﬀ ¯ θ(N) must satisfy:
F(¯ θ(N)) = x(N) (1)
The cutoﬀ ¯ θ(N), as well as the allocation across the two activities is deter-
mined by free-entry conditions: the cutoﬀ type must be indiﬀerent between
researching any of the existing applications (unless xe (N) < 0), researching
a frontier application (unless xf (N) < 0) and opting out of research.
Deﬁne c(x)=F−1 (x), the cost of the marginal researcher in the existing
application search, so that ¯ θ(N)=c(x(N)). It is increasing from (1).L e t
ρ(N)=
xe(N)
x(N) be the probability that the new innovation is for an existing
application. Let the random variable τ (N) b et h ea r r i v a lt i m eo fa ni n n o -
vation given the aggregate research intensity x(N). The expected discount
factor can be calculated using the Poisson distribution as:








Note that the expected time it takes for an application to be replaced by an
improved one depends on the search intensities, hence the expected discount
factor depends on the current state of the industry, summarized by N.
10To calculate the expected beneﬁt of doing research, let ﬁrst V (N) be the
value of an incumbent ﬁrm just as a new innovation arrives, but without







((1 − δ(N))π + δ(N)V (N)) (2)
+(1 − ρ(N))((1 − δ(N +1 ) )π + δ(N +1 )V (N +1 ) )
This allows us to deﬁne the ﬂow of expected beneﬁt to the two research
activities:
Ve (N)=( 1 − δ(N))π + δ(N)V (N) (3)
Vf (N)=( 1 − δ(N +1 ) )π + δ(N +1 )V (N +1 )
Ve (N)/r and Vf (N)/r are the expected total proﬁts of a researcher condi-
tional on achieving one of the corresponding innovations when the current
state is N. By the properties of Poisson distribution they also represent the
ﬂow of expected proﬁts from innovation. Therefore, the free-entry conditions
for the researchers are:
Ve (N)/r ≤ ¯ θ(N) (4)
Vf (N)/r ≤ ¯ θ(N)+η
with equality whenever the corresponding task is undertaken by a positive
mass of researchers.
Formally, the recursive equilibrium requires that agents optimize accord-
ing to equation (4) given (2) and (3), and these individual decisions agree
with aggregate variables in (1).
Next we summarize the results of this section in a proposition. We follow
the proposition with a discussion, including a series of lemmas, that establish
the result, as well as establishing a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists some N∗ such that xf(N) > 0 and xe(N) > 0
for N<N ∗.F u r t h e r , xf(N∗)=0and xe(N∗) > 0.F i n a l l y , x(N) is
increasing in N.
11Despite the fact that the per period proﬁts are the same for new applica-
tions and improvements to existing applications (π), competitive innovators
may be willing to pay the additional cost to develop a new application. The
reason is that, due to the increasing cost of researchers, research intensity on
existing applications rises less than proportionally to the number of existing
applications. As a result, the amount of research on improvements, per appli-
cation, is declining in the number of applications; this implies that the value
of having a marketable application rises as the total number of applications
increases. If that value is rising fast enough from N to N +1,t h ee x t r av a l u e
from developing a new application makes the extra cost worth paying. Even-
tually this increased value gets small and may be insuﬃcient to draw research
in new applications. We then reach a steady state number of applications,
N∗, at which point there is only research in existing applications.
On the other hand, anytime there is research on new applications, there
must also be research on improving existing applications. If there were only
research on new applications for a given N, then developing an improvement
would make more proﬁts than a new application: it would earn proﬁts until
the next new application, at which point the continuation value would be as
much as the new application would have made. This is of course impossible
since improvements are less expensive. We get the following picture of inno-
vation. For N below the steady state, there are both types of research, with
total research intensity increasing due to the rising value of a leading edge
application.
In order to see the results in Proposition 1, suppose ﬁrst that there are
some states N and N +1in which both research dimensions are active in
equilibrium. Using the free entry condition we can now characterize the
equilibrium aggregate research intensity for times when both activities are
undertaken.
Note that (3) implies Ve (N +1 )=Vf (N). Combining it with the free
entry conditions we get:
c(x(N +1 ) )=c(x(N)) + η (5)
For example, if F (θ)=( θ − θl)/a,t h e nc(x)=ax + θl and:
x(N)=x(N +1 )− η/a
This condition allows us to show that aggregate research is increasing in
N :
12Lemma 1 As long as both research tasks are active, aggregate research eﬀort
x(N), and value V (N) are increasing in N.
Proof. Monotonicity of x(N) follows directly from (5) and monotonicity of
c(x).
Regarding V (N), from the free-entry conditions we have
Ve (N +1 )/r − Ve (N)/r = η
⇓
(δ(N) − δ(N +1 ) )π + δ(N +1 )V (N +1 )− δ(N)V (N)=rη
⇓
(δ(N) − δ(N +1 ) )
| {z }
<0
(π − V (N))
| {z }
>0
+δ(N +1 )( V (N +1 )− V (N)) = rη
where (δ(N) − δ(N +1 ) ) < 0 b e c a u s ew eh a v ep r o v e nt h a tx(N) is
increasing. As the ﬁrst element on the LHS is negative, we must have
V (N +1 )>V(N) for the equality to hold.
Next, we establish the existence of a steady-state and that before stead-
state both research tasks are indeed active:
Lemma 2 For any N, x(N) > 0. For any N>0 such that xf (N) > 0, it
must be that xe (N) > 0. Finally, there exists N∗ such that for all N ≥ N∗
xf (N)=0 .
Proof. We start with the second claim. Suppose xe (N)=0and xf (N) > 0.
Then, combining (2) and (3) we get Ve (N)=Vf (N), which contradicts the
free entry conditions (4).
Now, suppose that there exists an N such that x(N)=0 . Then δ (N)=0
and Ve (N)=π. Since there are researchers with θ<π / r(which we assumed
to get any innovation in equilibrium), that violates free entry condition.
Finally, suppose that for all N, xe (N) and xf (N) are positive. From the
analysis before we know that this would imply Ve (N +1 )=Ve (N)+rη for
all N. B u tt h a ti sn o tp o s s i b l ea sVe (N) ∈ (0,π).
We will assume that this N∗ < ¯ N (the total number of feasible func-
tions). In a steady-state N∗, the value and research intensity can be easily




















Call the solution to these two equations, for arbitrary N, ˆ V (N) and ˆ xe(N),
with the associated ˆ δ(N).
Lemma 3 ˆ V (N) is increasing in N; ˆ xe(N) is increasing in N.
Proof. Pick any N and consider N0 = N +1 . ˆ V (N) increasing: suppose
not. Then ˆ xe(N) would weakly decrease to satisfy (7) But that implies that
ˆ δ(N) would weakly decrease; since V (N) <π(the maximum ﬂow payoﬀ),
(6).implies that V (N∗) is increasing.
Finally, suppose ˆ xe(N) is weakly decreasing. That would require that
δ(N∗) i sw e a k l yd e c r e a s i n ga n dw o u l dv i o l a t e( 7 )s i n c ew eh a v ea l r e a d y
established that ˆ V (N) is increasing.
In order for N∗ to be a steady state, it must be the case that it is not
proﬁtable to search for a new application at N∗,e v e ni fn of u r t h e re ﬀort on
new applications were researched. In other words, at the steady state N∗,
the following inequality holds:
(1 −b δ(N +1 ) ) π +b δ(N +1 )ˆ V (N +1 )≤ r(c(ˆ xe (N)) + η) (8)
where
b δ(N +1 )=
ˆ xe(N +1 )
r +ˆ xe(N +1 )
is the expected discount factor if at state N+1the research is xe =ˆ xe(N+1)
and xf =0 . Condition (8) can be simpliﬁed to
c(ˆ xe (N +1 ) )− c(ˆ xe (N)) ≤ η
If c(ˆ xe (N)) is concave, there clearly exists exactly one "crossing point"
which provides a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness of the steady-state and
equilibrium:
Lemma 4 Suppose c(ˆ xe (N)) is concave in N. Then the steady state N∗ is
unique.
It can be veriﬁed directly that c(ˆ xe (N)) is in fact concave for many
distribution functions F, for example a linear one (see also the numerical
14example in the next section). The intuition why we should expect it to hold
is as follows: suppose ﬁrst that δ(N) is constant. Then the solution to (6)





is concave. Now, for (7) to hold, c(ˆ xe (N))
and δ(N) have to increase. This adjustment has to be larger the more V (N)
increases, so it is smaller for larger N. Therefore, for a lot of shapes of c(x)
we would obtain that the c(ˆ xe (N)) would be concave.
Once we ﬁnd N∗ and xe (N∗), we can solve the open-standard model by
working from the eventual steady state. In particular, iterating on (5) we
get:
Lemma 5 Aggregate research eﬀort x(N) is increasing in N according to
c(x(N +1 ) )=c(x(N)) + η.
Given x(N) for all N ≤ N∗ and V (N∗),w ec a nu s ee q u a t i o n( 4 )t oc a l -
culate V (N). Finally, to compute the individual values xe(N) and xf(N),
given x(N) and V (N), we can use equation (2). Note that this construc-
tion is unique for a given N∗,s ot h a tc(ˆ xe (N)) concave delivers a unique
equilibrium.
3.2 Numerical Example
We assume that F is linear, F(θ)=( θ − θl)/a,a n ds oc(x)=ax + θl.
We consider the following parameters: r =5 %(annual interest rate)
a =0 .01, θl =0 .2, η = θl/25,λ=1 .5 (so quality increases by 50%). Then
N∗ =9 . In the steady-state x(N∗) ≈ 9.66, which is also the average number
of improvements per year. The research intensities are shown in the ﬁgure
as a function of N: the top line is total investment, the decreasing line is the
investment in new applications, and the third line is investment in existing
applications.
Note that the diﬀerence between the extra cost η of a new application is
at most four percent of the cost of researching an improvement (for θ = θl),
but yet diﬀerences between intensities research intensities new and existing
applications are large.
The expected time to the next frontier application is drawn in the next
ﬁgure:
It takes less than 5 months for the ﬁrst application to be invented. The




















Figure 2: Time to Next Application
16exist and ﬁnally reaches over 49 years (not shown on the ﬁg u r e )f o rt h em o v e
from N =8to N∗.Note that the diﬀerence between the extra cost η of a
new application is at most 4% of the cost of researching an improvement (for
θ = θl), but yet diﬀerences between intensities research intensities new and
existing applications are great.
4 Innovation Dynamics in a Closed Standard
4.1 Analytic Results
As we described above, with a closed standard pricing of the applications will
be diﬀerent as the monopolist owns all applications. The optimal strategy
of the monopolist will depend now not only on N but on the whole state of
the applications, i.e. not only on how many functions have application but
also on the quality of existing applications.
Recall that quality improves at rungs of λ>1 and let ji denote the




j. If there is no application for a given function, then let ji =0 .
Let Q = {j1,...,jN} denote the state of the applications. The monopolist
chooses research activities xe (Q),x f (Q) to maximize expected proﬁts. As
we argued before, the optimal price of the best application for function i is
λ
ji. At that price demand is xi =1 /pi =1 /λ
ji and hence the monopolist





which is increasing and concave in j. The proﬁt gain from a unit increase in
quality is









which is decreasing in j and ∆j → 0. For now, assume ∆0 −η>∆1, so that
the monopolist prefers to invest in frontier applications before improving
existing ones. We will later discuss how the optimal innovation strategy
diﬀers if this condition is not satisﬁed.
We begin by summarizing the results as a proposition.
Proposition 2 If ji =0for any i, then xf > 0 and xe =0 .E x i s t i n g
applications are improved only if ji =m i nQ. Total innovation x is strictly
17decreasing in the number of innovations achieved. There exists a level j∗ such
that all research stops once all applications reach j∗.
We will prove this proposition through a sequence of lemmas and at the
same time we will provide a more detailed characterization. We ﬁrst argue
that the optimal strategy is to continue research only up to a level j∗ and
to put research activity only at the current lowest-level application, i.e. one
that maximizes ∆j. As a result, research is done in layers: at any time the
monopolist works on the lowest-level applications until he brings all of them
to the next level. This continues until he reaches level j∗ with all of them.
Lemma 6 Optimal research strategy in the closed standard satisﬁes:
a) In the long run research stops once all applications reach a level j∗ which
is the smallest integer s.t. ∆j∗ <r θ l
b) In the long run all functions have applications.
c) In any time the research is done on a product with the highest ∆j (i.e.
lowest ji).
Proof. See appendix.
This partial characterization allows us to reduce the state space to rele-
vant points with applications on two levels only. Abusing slightly notation,
let Q now denote a pair (j,k) where j is the lowest level of applications across
i and k is the number of functions on this level. We will use a convention




. Finally, let C (x)=xc(x)
denote the total cost of hiring x mass of researchers, each at wage c(x),w h e r e
c(x)=F−1 (x) if xf =0and c(x)=F−1 (x)+η if xf > 0.
We can prove the following monotonicity result.
Lemma 7 x(Q) is strictly decreasing.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is that the rewards to research decrease for two reasons.
First, the immediate rewards, ∆j, are weakly decreasing. Second, as there
is only a ﬁnite number of rewards, the increase in continuation-payoﬀsa r e
strictly decreasing: ﬁnding the ﬁrst innovation brings closer the proﬁts from
all the subsequent innovations, an eﬀect missing for the last innovation.
We will now determine recursively the levels x(Q) of optimal research.
The value function of the monopolist is deﬁned recursively through the op-
timization problem:




(π(Q) − C (x)) +
x
x + r
VM (Q +1 ) (9)
The ﬁrst order condition is




For example, if F (θ)=( θ − θl)/a,t h e nC (x)=ax2 + θlx, the FOC
becomes
VM (Q +1 )− π(Q)=ax
2 +2 rax+ rθl




VM (Q +1 )− π(Q) − rθl
a
− r
which is positive as long as VM (Q +1 )− π(Q) >r θ l, i.e. the gain is worth
hiring some researchers.4
From lemma 6 we can ﬁnd j∗ as the closest integer higher than the solution
to ∆j = rθl. This can be simpliﬁed rewritten as j =l n( ( λ − 1)/(rλθl))/lnλ.




.T h ev a l u ei nt h i ss t e a d y - s t a t ei s :
VM (Q
∗)=Nπj∗
That allows us to solve recursively for x(Q) and VM (Q) by iterating on (10)
and (9) and ﬁnishes the description of the equilibrium.
Remark 1 We have assumed that ∆0 − η>∆1. If that does not hold, the
optimal research policy varies only slightly. Let j0 be the smallest j such that
∆0 − η>∆1. If j0 > 1, then the optimal strategy is to develop ﬁrst the j0
applications for a given function before developing a frontier application for
a new function.
Remark 2 Given the symmetry across applications, all strategies with a
given level of aggregate x(Q) that put all the research activity at the lowest-
quality applications, but diﬀer in the division of x(Q) among them are payoﬀ
equivalent and lead to the same evolution of applications.
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Figure 3: Innovation in a Closed Standard
4.2 Numerical Example
We keep the parameters from the open-standard example: r =5 %(annual
interest rate), a =0 .01, θl =0 .2, η = θl/25,λ=1 .5. The new parameter
we need to specify is N. We will compare two values: N =9and N = 100.
Given these parameter values, j∗ =8so the monopolist will research up to
8 applications per ladder. The ﬁgures show the dynamics of innovation as a
function of J =
P
ji for N =9on the left and for N =1 0 0on the right.
The intensity of innovation is huge in the beginning (as compared with
the open standard): for N =9it takes on average less than a month in
between the ﬁrst 30 innovations (in the open standard in the steady-state the
innovations come on average 1.2 months apart and the speed of innovation
is much slower in the beginning - the ﬁrst innovation arrives an order of
magnitude faster in the closed standard). Note also that for N =1 0 0 .t h e
innovation starts almost 3 times as large!
Note further that one can interpret these diﬀerences as diﬀerences be-
tween innovation by large ﬁrms (the monopolized closed standard) and small
ﬁrms (the open standard). However, in this case, the model suggests that
measurement of these diﬀerences is diﬃcult. First, whether you observe more
innovation by large or small ﬁrms depends on the point in the product cy-
cle; in the beginning, it appears that large ﬁrms do more innovating, but
later on the pattern reverses. Moreover, our model suggests that diﬀerent
market structures lead to diﬀerent types of innovation, so simply measur-
20ing a one dimensional innovation variable for each is not an apples-to-apples
comparison.
5 Software Applications with Open and Closed
Standards
The analysis so far focused on stand-alone applications and took the market
s t r u c t u r ea sg i v e n .W en o wu s et h em o d e lt oc o n s i d e rsoftware applications
and to better understand the tradeoﬀs in choosing a closed or open standard
regime. In this section we consider the choice by the owner of hardware and
in the next section we discuss the welfare consequences.
In particular, we allow for the possibility that hardware can be sold by
the monopolist. The hardware in our model has no use in itself, but is neces-
sary to use any application. We assumed that hardware is inﬁnitely durable
and bought in the beginning of the game, in anticipation of future applica-
tions (that assumption is unrealistic, as hardware always comes with some
applications immediately available, but that simpliﬁcation is not aﬀecting
the economics we describe).
The consumers will be willing to pay up to their expected surplus for the
hardware, which equals their total utility minus the utility that they could
obtain from directly performing the function. In the closed standard, the
monopolist always follows limit pricing of applications to the direct option.
Therefore, there is zero expected surplus from the hardware, all proﬁts come
from sales of the applications. In other words, if the software market is
monopolized, the hardware can be sold by competitive ﬁrms.
5.1 Hardware Pricing in Open Standard
If the standard is open, then prices are pi =1 /λ, quantity is 1/λ and con-





CS(j)=( j − 1)lnλ
Therefore the hardware seller can extract up to the expected present value
of CS(j) summed over all applications.
Let J =
P
ji be the number of quality improvements summed over all
21applications. Then the current ﬂow of surplus given J is
CS(J,N)=( J − N)ln(λ)






















In a state N<N ∗, the total surplus is:
U (J,N)=( 1− δ)CS(J,N)+δ(ρU (J +1 ,N)+( 1− ρ)U (J +1 ,N+1 ) )
(note that δ = δ(N) and ρ = ρ(N)). Since research intensity for the open
standard depends only on N,w ec a ne x p a n dt h i sa s






+δ (1 − ρ)U (J +1 ,N+1 )+δ
2ρ(1 − ρ)U (J +2 ,N+1 )+...
and so








k−1 U (J + k,N +1 )
We guess that
U (J,N)=l n( λ)(J − N + aN)
and plug this back in for U(J + k,N +1 )to get :
U (J,N)=l n( λ)
µ
J +
aδ (1 − ρ)+δρ
1 − δρ
¶
This conﬁrms the guess; we get the following recursive equation for a :
aN =
aN+1δ (N)(1− ρ(N)) + δ(N)ρ(N)
1 − δ(N)ρ(N)
(11)
22Since we have found before aN∗=
δ(N∗)
1−δ(N∗), we can use (11) to calculate aN for
all N<N ∗.Then we can calculate
U (0,0) = ln(λ)a0
and the optimal hardware price is
ln(λ)a0/r
The analysis so far allows us to calculate and compare the proﬁts in the
two regimes numerically, but direct analytic comparison is diﬃcult. Therefore
in the next two sections we develop further results to highlight the role scope
of feasible innovation plays in the choice of the hardware monopolist. For
simplicity we will focus on the linear case F (θ)=( θ − θl)/a.
5.2 Large ¯ N
First we develop a result for the case where the future is relatively important
(low r) ¯ N is high and η is small. In this case, it is better to extract surplus
through monopolizing applications, since there is a great deal of beneﬁti n
internalizing the beneﬁts of making the scope as large as possible. Of course
o n em u s tb es u ﬃciently patient to make this plan proﬁtable.
We ﬁrst establish two lemmas, which serve to compute the payoﬀ from a
closed standard and bound above the payoﬀ for an open standard
Lemma 8 In the linear case, F (θ)=( θ − θl)/a, as N →∞ , the value from
the closed standard converges to 1
4
(π−r(θl+η))2
ar2 (in ﬂow terms)
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 9 The hardware price for the open standard is bounded above by
ln(λ)
π−rθl
r (in ﬂow terms).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 If r< π
θl+4alnλ then there exists η∗ > 0 such that for all
η ≤ η∗ if N is suﬃciently large, the monopolist prefers to have a closed
standard rather than an open one.
















This expression is positive and decreasing in r. Solving for it to be equal 1
yields the bound. Given r less than this bound we can ﬁnd an η∗ > 0 such
that ratio is still less than 1. Then, for any η ≤ η∗ we can ﬁnd N large enough
that the payoﬀs under the closed are arbitrarily close to the calculated bound
(for this and all larger N).
Remark 3 For a given η we can calculate a bound on the interest rates:
r
∗ = π
θl + η +2 alnλ − 2
p
ηalnλ + a2 ln
2 λ
(θl + η)
2 +4 aθl lnλ
Then, if r<r ∗ we can ﬁnd N
∗




This bound converges to the one in proposition as η → 0. For example, if
θl = a =0 .1,η= θl/10 and λ =1 .5 (so that π = 1
3) then the bound is
r∗ =1 1 8 % . Any discount rate smaller than that makes the monopolist prefer
ac l o s e ds t a n d a r df o rs u ﬃciently high N.
5.3 Small ¯ N
We will now argue that if N is small and r is small, then the open standard
choice will be more proﬁtable (we keep F (θ) linear). We will focus on the
case N =1as it illustrates the intuition best.
For the open standard, once the ﬁrst application is developed, the free-
entry condition is:
(1 − δ)π/r = c(x)
which in the linear case yields that steady-state x∗ solves:
π
r + x∗ = ax
∗ + θl (12)
24Direct calculation shows x∗ is decreasing in r.
Following the calculations in Section 5.1, consumer surplus for j>0 is
CS(j)=( j − 1)lnλ, and CS(0) = 0. Let δ = x∗
x∗+r. The expected surplus
after the ﬁrst application is developed is:
U (1,1) = (1 − δ)CS(1,1) + δ(1 − δ)CS(2,1) + δ
2 (1 − δ)CS(3,1)...




k =l n( λ)
x∗
r







We can now bound U (0,0) = h. T h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o na tN =0is
(1 − δ)π + δV(1)
|{z }
=0




r + x∗ − (θl + η))/a (13)
Remark 4 We have assumed that η is small enough so that xf > 0. This
assumption corresponds in this case to:
η<
π
r + x∗ − θl




If η is too large compared with π, then the open standard will fail to develop
even the ﬁrst application. Then the closed standard is necessary to overcome
the public-good aspect of the higher cost of developing a new application and
clearly the closed standard will be more proﬁtable.
On the other hand, if the hardware comes with the ﬁrst application, then this
additional restriction is not necessary.
Assuming π>η
θl+η
a , xf converges to a strictly positive number as r → 0.
Therefore the price of hardware (in payoﬀ ﬂows) is
h = U (0) =
xf
xf + r
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Figure 4: Surplus Extraction
Proposition 4 If π>η
θl+η
a , then there exists r∗ > 0 such that if r<r ∗ and
N is suﬃciently small, the open standard is more proﬁtable to the hardware
owner than the closed standard.
Proof. Follows directly from the calculations above: for N =1and small
r, the total proﬁts from closed standard are at most 1/r, while the price of
h a r d w a r ei nt h eo p e ns t a n d a r di so nt h eo r d e rO(1/r2).
5.4 Numerical example (eﬀects of N)
Return to our two numerical examples. As N∗ =9 , then as long as N ≥ 9,
the price of hardware is independent of N.Contrary, the proﬁts in the closed
standard depend crucially on N. In the ﬁgure below we compare the proﬁts
from hardware in the open standard (the horizontal line) with the proﬁts
from software in the closed standard regime (the increasing curve). As the
discussion in this section points out, for small N the proﬁts are higher from an
open standard and when N is large they are higher from the closed standard
case (in this example the cutoﬀ is N =9 1 ) .
266S o c i a l W e l f a r e
In the previous section we calculated the surplus the hardware owner can
expect from diﬀerent market structures. For policy questions it is useful to
calculate social welfare under various production structures.5 The only por-
tion of surplus that we have not calculated so far is the surplus of researchers.
6.1 Surplus of the researchers
The supply function of the researchers is c(x). Therefore the ﬂow of producer











( N o t et h a ti td o e sn o td e p e n do nθl, so the surplus calculation when the
researchers work on existing applications or frontier ones is the same).
In the closed standard case, the total expected discounted researcher sur-
plus is:
VR (Q)=( 1− δ(Q))PS(x(Q)) + δ(Q)VR (Q +1 )
and we have VR (Q∗)=0 . So we can ﬁnd the VR (0) iteratively.
I nt h eo p e ns t a n d a r dc a s e ,g i v e na nN, the total expected discounted
researcher surplus is:
VR (N)=( 1− δ(N))PS(x(N)) + δ(N)(ρVR (N)+( 1− ρ)VR (N +1 ) )
Hence
VR (N) = ((1 − δ(N))PS(x(N)) + δ(N)(1− ρ)VR (N +1 ) )/(1 − δ(N)ρ)




5Note that we do not study a planner with complete control, as he would trivially do










Figure 5: Social Welfare
so again it is easy to ﬁnd the time-zero expected discounted producer surplus
of the researchers.
Note that in our model the consumers are left with no surplus due to their
homogeneity and unit-elastic demand. As a result, the diﬀerence between to-
tal surplus and the surplus of the owner of hardware is small unless research
is done on a very large scale. Therefore the ineﬃciency of the decision of
the monopolist will be in general small (see the following example). A bet-
ter model to study policy questions would expand the model and introduce
heterogenous consumers to allow for consumer surplus in either regime.
6.2 Numerical Example
After adding the welfare of researchers to obtain total welfare calculation for
the numerical examples we have presented before, the picture as a function
of N looks like this:
For comparison we have also plotted the value in the closed standard (the
diﬀerence between the total surplus in the open standard and the hardware
price is negligible as the research intensity is small in the open standard).
As we see, for a wide range on N the hardware owner’s preferences agree
with maximization of total surplus. Only in the range N ∈ {84,...90} the
hardware monopolist would choose to open the standard while the total sur-
plus would be maximized by keeping it closed. Still, the potential social
28ineﬃciency is small in this example.
7 Subsidizing innovation
T h ee q u i l i b r i aw eh a v ec h a r a c t e r i z e da b o v ed on o ta c h i e v es o c i a lﬁrst-best
along many directions: the prices of the ﬁnal products are above marginal
cost of production, too little innovation takes place and in the closed standard
case, the monopsony power in the market for researchers creates ineﬃciency
there. Hence there are many ways a government can intervene to improve
eﬃciency. We now focus on one possibility: subsidizing innovation in an
open standard and ask how the social returns compare between subsidizing
frontier or existing applications.
To keep things simple, we focus on one-time unexpected subsidy for
the marginal researcher in the steady state of the open standard to avoid
crowding-out of private innovation caused by the anticipated future govern-
ment subsidy. In equilibrium the steady state innovation level x∗ is socially
ineﬃcient, in the sense that the total surplus would increase if additional re-
searchers joined the innovation eﬀort. The reason is that the private return is
equal to r
x∗+rπ while the social return is equal to CS∆/r: the second number
is higher because the social beneﬁts accrue forever, while the private returns
occur only until the ﬁrm gets replaced by an improvement (plus, given our
demand structure, the increase in ﬂow of consumer surplus is higher than
the proﬁt ﬂow: CS∆ = lnλ>λ−1
λ = π).6 Therefore a subsidy to research
increases total welfare. Any such policy would have to decide whether to
favor improvements of existing applications or development of frontier appli-
cations.
To model this, we simply ask what the planner’s payoﬀ would be to one
arrival of each type of innovation. For a quality improvement, the beneﬁt
is just CS∆/r =( l n λ)/r. Innovation in a frontier application would have
two eﬀects. First, it creates additional proﬁt ﬂow, without business stealing,
hence a return to ﬁrms of π/r (assuming that the innovation is sold to a
ﬁrm that then sells it at proﬁt maximizing price; if instead the price is set at
marginal cost, then the return is larger, but we want to focus on intervention
in innovation alone). Second, a frontier innovation increases N and hence the
steady state intensity of research from ˆ xe (N∗) to ˆ xe(N∗+1)(recall from Sec-
6CS∆ denotes an increase of equilibrium consumer surplus ﬂow of having one additional
application: CS∆ = CS(J +1 ,N) − CS(J,N).
29tion 3 that ˆ xe(N) is deﬁned as the equilibrium research intensity if no further
frontier applications are expected in the future).7 This second eﬀect is going
to dominate in the long run, even though ﬂow of beneﬁtf r o mi n v e n t i n ga n
improvement to existing applications is higher than from inventing a frontier
application, because increase in x leads to an increase in the growth rate of
future welfare. Therefore a suﬃciently patient planner will prefer subsidizing
frontier applications.
Formally, the steady-state free-entry condition is:
π
r +ˆ xe(N)/N
− c(ˆ xe(N)) = 0 (14)
This expression is increasing in N and decreasing in ˆ xe, hence unless c(x) is
vertical at ˆ xe(N∗),i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tˆ xe(N∗ +1 )> ˆ xe(N∗). Further-
more, notice that this expression is decreasing in ˆ xe faster if c(x) is increasing
faster (to the right of ˆ xe(N)).
One might be concerned about the behavior or N∗ as r gets small; the
following lemma shows that N∗ converges to a ﬁnite number, and so, for
large enough ¯ N, an additional ladder is feasible even for small r.
Lemma 10 limr→0N∗ < ∞.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given that N∗ is well deﬁned for small r, we can state formally the com-
parative static in r :
Proposition 5 Suppose c(x) is ﬁnite for all x.F o r s u ﬃciently low r,t h e
planner obtains a higher social return from (one-time, unexpected) investment
in frontier applications than in existing applications.
Proof. As we argued above, the total social return the one-time creation of
one additional existing application is simply a constant ﬂow of one additional
"step" consumer surplus: CS∆/r. When instead a new frontier application is
invented, customers do not gain any additional surplus immediately (as we
assumed that the product will be sold by a monopolist) but they will enjoy a
7We assume that c(ˆ xe (N)) is concave in N to make sure that N∗ +1will be indeed a
steady state, see Lemma 4. There is also a third eﬀect that the frontier application costs
more, but compared to all future beneﬁts it is likely to be small and hence we ignore η in
this section.
30faster rate of arrival of future innovations: ˆ xe(N∗ +1 )instead of x(N∗).( I n
terms of total surplus there is also an increase of proﬁts for the industry, but




∗ +1 )− x(N
∗))
The ratio of the total returns to customers from the two types of innovation
is hence
ˆ xe(N∗ +1 )− x(N∗)
r
(15)
As r → 0, condition (14) converges to:
Nπ =ˆ xec(ˆ xe(N))
hence even in the limit ˆ xe(N) is strictly increasing in N. Therefore, for suﬃ-
ciently small r the return to customers (and total social return) is higher if
the planner subsidizes frontier applications.
To understand the role of the shape of c(x) on the planner’s preference,
consider the following comparative static: ﬁx c(x) for x ≤ x(N∗),b u t ,f o r
x>x (N∗), let ˜ c(x) <c (x),s ot h a t˜ c(x) is ﬂatter (more elastic) than c(x).
Under ˜ c(x), an additional ladder has more social beneﬁt( b e c a u s ei tw i l l
increase x by more than if the costs were given by c(x),according to (15)).
But, by contrast, an additional ladder is less attractive to the innovator
under ˜ c(x), for the same reason; the high rate of future arrivals discourages
frontier research. As a result, for both cost functions, the steady state is N∗
with research x(N∗), but the social beneﬁt of an additional ladder is greater
under ˜ c(x).
This logic is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Let ˜ c(x)=c(x) for x ≤ x(N∗),b u tl e t˜ c(x) <c (x) for
x>x (N∗). Then the planner has a greater preference for frontier research
under ˜ c(x)
One interpretation of new ladders versus improvements is the contrast
between basic research and applied developments. The model suggests both
a rationale for governmental support for basic research (the greater research
intensity that they foster), and an intuition for when this impact is likely to
justify government involvement. For ﬂat c(x), the private beneﬁtt of r o n t i e r
research is small, but the social beneﬁt from an additional ladder is large.
Both are driven by the fact that ﬂat c(x) l e a d st oab i gi m p a c to fan e w
ladder on equilibrium research intensity.
318C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown that analyzing two margins for innovation (improvements
versus new products), the tradeoﬀ between diﬀerent market structures is
not so much about quantity of innovation as about allocation of innovative
eﬀorts. Closed standards/ﬁrms with market dominance are good at coming
up with new products while open standards/markets with many small ﬁrms
are better at improving products. The welfare consequences depend crucially
on the fundamentals of the technology, like possible scope of applications.
T h em o d e l ss u g g e s t st h a tm a r k e ts t r u c t u r ei m p a c t sn o to n l yt h ea m o u n t
but also the direction of technological change. Considering other ways that
market structure aﬀects the direction of technological change, as introduced
by Acemoglu (2002), seems to be an interesting way to extend the basic
structure.
T h em o d e lc o u l db ea p p l i e di no t h e rw a y s .K l e p p e ra n dT h o m p s o n( 2 0 0 5 )
show that a variety of empirical facts about ﬁrm dynamics can be explained
through a model of submarkets, where submarkets arrive exogenously. One
can view the arrival of new applications as a sort of new submarket; one would
only have to add obsolescence for it to match Klepper and Thompson’s notion
more directly. We have focused on two market structures which correspond to
some real world situations. Considering other market structures, including
an optimal one for extraction of surplus for the monopolist, is a topic for
future research.
9 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of lemma 6. a) the beneﬁtt oi n n o v a t i o na tag i v e np r o d u c ti sa t
most (1 − πj)/r = 1
rλj. As the cost of hiring researchers is at least c(0) = θl,
for high enough j the expected beneﬁt becomes larger than marginal cost,
making further research unproﬁtable. Now, suppose that the research stops
at some j. If ∆j >r θ l, then a proﬁtable deviation is to hire researchers with
θ ∈ [θl,θ l + ε] for some small ε. If ∆j−1 <r θ l then a proﬁtable deviation is
to reduce research activity to zero once the application reaches level j − 1.
b) That follows directly from the assumption that F(π/r − η) > 0 (or
equivalently, π1/r > θl + η), so the expected beneﬁto ft h eﬁrst application
is higher than the cost of hiring the most eﬃcient researchers.
c) Given a researcher is hired, it is optimal to put his activity in a product
32with the highest expected return. The immediate return, ∆j, is the highest
for the goods with the lowest j and the continuation return (from subsequent
innovations, ∆j+1...∆j∗−1) is also highest for those goods. Hence such strat-
egy is optimal (see the proof of lemma 7 for a more detailed calculation).
P r o o fo fl e m m a7 . Rewrite the closed standard problem in the following
way. Let pQ =( π(Q) − π(Q − 1))/r, the incremental beneﬁto ft h eQth
innovation, where there are Q∗ = j∗ ¯ N innovations. Note that pQ is weakly
decreasing. Let C(x)=xc(x).





























































Note that the solution to the whole problem is G(1).Denote the solution to
this problem for any Q by {xQ
n}. Note further that G(Q) is strictly decreasing,















gives at least as high a payoﬀ as G(Q+1), and increasing the last term from
zero makes the payoﬀ strictly higher.
The ﬁrst order condition for xn in the full problem is
pn + G(n +1 )=C
0(xn)(r + xn) − C(xn)
If C0(xn)(r + xn) − C(xn) is increasing, then it is immediate that, since
the right hand side is strictly decreasing, the left hand side must be strictly
increasing. Extending the proof to arbitrary C is a direct application of







the virtual value for the right hand side is deﬁned almost everywhere by d¯ κ
dx,
and extended by right limits everywhere else.
P r o o fo fl e m m a8 . Note that, for the closed standard,
VM (Q)=m a x
x (1 − δ)(Nπ− xc(x)) +
x
x + r
(VM (Q +1 ) )










π − (θl + η)r
ar
(16)
and the sum of expected discounted proﬁts:
VM (0) = (1 − δ)(0− xc(x)) + δ(1 − δ)(π − xc(x))...












(the last equality uses δ
1−δ = x/r).




(π − r(θl + η))
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ar2
P r o o fo fl e m m a9 . The hardware price (in terms of payoﬀ ﬂow) for an













































2 +4 aN∗ (π − rθl) − (arN
∗ + θl)
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w h i c hi sau n i f o r mb o u n do nx∗ (N∗), that allows us to bound the price of
hardware without ﬁnding the steady state. The hardware price (in terms of




P r o o fo fl e m m a1 0 . Recall that ˆ xe(N) is deﬁned by the solution to (6)




So ˆ xe(N) is decreasing in r and increasing in N. As r → 0, this condition
becomes:
c(ˆ xe(N)) ˆ xe(N)=Nπ (17)
so ˆ xe(N) converges to a number. Now, to see that the steady-state N∗
is bounded away from ∞ as r → 0,suppose c0 (x) is bounded from above.
Suppose that for every N,
c(ˆ xe(N +1 ) )− c(ˆ xe(N)) >η
35(the opposite inequality is our condition for N∗, see discussion before Lemma
4). Then, in (17) the LHS is growing at least linearly, while the RHS is
growing much slower than linearly. So it cannot work. Therefore, even as
r → 0,N ∗ is bounded.
10 Appendix B: φ<1
Throughout the paper we have maintained Assumption 2 that φ =1 . How
would the analysis change if instead:
Assumption 2B: φ<1.
The fundamental change is that proﬁts earned by a frontier application
will be higher than proﬁts earned by subsequent improvements, that is π1 >
πj>1 = π. How is it going to aﬀect the dynamics of innovation?
In the open standard case, if π1 − η<π , then the equilibrium changes
only slightly. In particular, equation (2) f o rn o n - f r o n t i e r( j ≥ 2) applications







((1 − δ(N))π1 + δ(N)V1 (N)) (18)
+(1 − ρ(N))((1 − δ(N +1 ) )π1 + δ(N +1 )V1 (N +1 ) )
Also, we need to modify the beneﬁtt oxf :
Vf (N)=( 1− δ(N +1 ) )π1 + δ(N +1 )V1 (N +1 )
and the free-entry condition changes accordingly. The N∗ has to be cal-
culated with the new value of Vf (N) and a lower φ clearly leads to a (weakly)
higher N∗.I fπ1 is very large (in particular, suﬃciently larger than π − η),
then the equilibrium can change qualitatively as well: it is possible that
for some N all research activity will be in the frontier applications, that is
xf > 0=xe. The reason Lemma 2 can be overturned is that when π1 − π
is larger than η, paying more for a frontier application can be more than
compensated by the higher proﬁts (for this to happen it is not suﬃcient that
π1 − η>π ,since due to business stealing returns to innovation are smaller
than πj/r).
In the closed standard the changes are less dramatic: we have already
taken into account that the C (x) function diﬀers for frontier and non-frontier
36applications by ηx.Now we have to allow for π(Q) to vary as well and increase
∆0 accordingly. A higher π0 will clearly imply a more intensive research on
the frontier applications, but once j =1is reached for all N,it will not have
any further eﬀects.
Finally, in terms of the choice between closed and open standard, the
impact of a higher π1 is ambiguous. On one hand, if N>N ∗ the closed
standard will enjoy the higher π1 from a larger number of products. On the
other hand, a larger π1 may tip an increase in N∗ (even from 0 to 1 - see
Remark 4) and hence to a large increase in the price of hardware.
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